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BOOK REVIEWS
Roy Moreland. Indianapolis, Indiana: The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1952. Pp. viii, 338.

THE LAW OF HOMICIDE.

In the form of a systematic review of both the common law rules
and their statutory counterparts relating to the law of homicide, Professor
Moreland has here presented a concise and coherent statement of existing
law together with his recommendations for a model statute on the subject.
A brief historical introduction, dealing with the law of homicide prior to
the eighteenth century, is followed by an examination of each of the
forms of common law homicides, that is intentional murder, negligent
murder, the felony murder, the killing of an officer while resisting arrest,
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. His analysis of
statutes dealing with these crimes, and with negligent homicide arising
from the operation of a motor vehicle, is followed by a discussion of
possible defenses. Copious footnotes and ample cross references illustrate
and integrate the points considered in the text while the accompanying
tables and index make cited material readily available.
According to the author, the term "malice aforethought" must go
because, having many meanings, it is a source of confusion. In its place,
he would substitute the phrase "deliberate and premeditated intent,"
defining the latter carefully. Further, he indicates a belief that the
felony murder doctrine, as such, should be eliminated, suggesting, as a
transitional step, a statute which would confine the doctrine to cases
involving arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, and providing for the punishment of this form of homicide as second degree murder. He joins with
other authorities in attacking the doctrine that the unintentional killing
of an officer while resisting an arrest should be treated as a murder and
would, instead, place criminal responsibility not upon the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the act but solely upon the wantonness or barbarousness
of the particular act for which the defendant is being held responsible.
Most welcome to lawyers and judges alike should be the inclusion of
a careful examination of the law of criminal negligence in manslaughter.
The need for an accurate definition of criminal negligence at this level of
homicide is demonstrated, beginning at page 62, by the discussion of the
variety of unsatisfactory pegs on which convictions have been hung. As
the author states, at page 120, "judges have not frankly faced the issue
whether criminal negligence is objective or subjective." Having examined the cases, and with the tort standard in mind, the author offers a
proposed statute which would define criminal negligence in terms of conduct "recklessly disregardful" of life or property, utilizing the standard

BOOK REVIEWS

of the reasonable man. The objective standard thus employed is supported
on the ground that "societal harm," not moral wrongdoing, is the thing
involved.
As with the felony murder doctrine, so also with the misdemeanormanslaughter doctrine, Professor Moreland believes present concepts should
be done away with, principally because, being based on the "unlawful
act" idea, that doctrine has also been the source of much confusion and
does not evaluate the relative dangerousness of the defendant to society.
Cases coming within the doctrine would, under his proposed scheme, stand
or fall under the tests of criminal negligence for murder and manslaughter
respectively. Various defenses, including those of self-defense and of
insanity, are treated and a model insanity statute has been suggested,
one intended to employ the several McNaghten rules on the point but
also including the concept of degrees of insanity.
On the whole, the treatise has been carefully prepared, is thoroughly
documented, and is readable as well as precise. Adoption of the orthodox
pattern on the subject facilitates correlation of the contents of this book
with other well-known standard works on homicide. Only the course of
time could provide a test for the author's model statute, but it is evident
that his review of existing authorities, his rejection of unsound doctrine,
and his efforts to sift modern attempts at codification, have resulted in the
production of a treatise which, revealing the excellence of the author's
scholarship, should become a work of great utility.
R. K. LARSON

Justice Bernard Botein. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1952. Pp. 337.

TRIAL JUDGE.

Biographical works dealing with the lives of Chief Justices, Supreme
Court judges, eminent lawyers, and even with those of common attorneys,
have been issued by the score, but a publication dealing with the experiences of a nisi prius judge may be considered something of an anomaly,
particularly when it is one written and published by a living member
of the trial bench of one of America's most densely populated counties.
This book is even the more noteworthy for it is not simply a chronological
account of a man's birth and growth, or a journal of his day-to-day
actions, so much as it is a fascinating, candid, behind-the-bench record
of impressions gathered from ten years of varied trial court experience.
Written primarily for laymen, and only secondarily for lawyers, the book
nevertheless furnishes an intimate and helpful message for all who may
have occasion to appear before a trial judge.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Hundreds of pages have been written on the point of the appropriate
way to try a case, to present evidence, to cross-examine successfully, to
argue to a jury, or on court-room conduct in general. Too frequently,
such works, if not merely anecdotal in character, deal with their subject
matter from the viewpoint of the trial attorney, hence seldom consider
the effect such efforts may have on the presiding judge. Not least among
the merits of this work, then, is the fact that through it the author
provides the other side of the story as he reveals the thoughts which race
through the mind of the judge while he observes the court-room scene
from his elevated position. The book is not lacking in those revealing
anecdotes, both personal and impersonal to the author, which often become the means whereby to drive home important lessons.
Stories do
here abound, illustrating those influences which could play on a court,
touching the difficulties which may be encountered with lawless jurors,
concerning the inadequacies of trial procedure, and narrating the dangers
to be found in lawyers' tricks. They furnish, however, no more than the
frame around which to present the many sound utterances of judicial
wisdom.1
Trial term in a substantial court in any large county brings many
diversified cases up for hearing. Any judge who has been torn over a
custody hearing, who has pondered the best solution for a large reorganization, who has struggled with exaggerated claims regarding personal
injury, or who has groped for the intention of contracting parties, will
endorse the remark of the author that, so considered, the lot of the judge
is not an enviable one. Such judges will, of course, agree that there are
compensating factors but how many others realize the full scope of the
trial judge's responsibility or count the hours of effort entailed in the
proper discharge thereof, If they would learn, the answer is here available
in as interesting a form as has ever before been presented.

THE STATES AND SUBVERSION.

Walter Gellhorn, Editor. Ithaca, New York:

Cornell University Press, 1952. Pp. vii, 454.
Six chapters of this book, devoted to a review of state experience in
the investigation of alleged communistic activity believed intended to
overthrow democratic government, provide a report on the actions, the

I The judge occasionally nods. See, for example, page 322 where his Honor
states: "Then to bed, where I read a few pages of an erudite article in a current
-law school review. As usual, this was an irresistible soporific, so I soon turned off
the bed lamp and went to sleep." Or consider page 329, where it appears that by
the time the judge had disposed of some motions he was ready for bed. In the
words of the author, "Although I was tired, my brain was spinning too rapidly to
augur well for a restful night. So I dipped into a Law Review article, which soon
produced the usual and desired effect." Some law review, touched at a sensitive
point, may call him to account for misusing its pages as a sleep-inducer!
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achievements, if any,' and the by-products of state investigative committees in Maryland and New York in the east, in California and Washington to the west, and Illinois and Michigan in the central area. Each
report, though prepared by a different author, tends to aisclose a discouraging picture of overzealousness run riot to the point where democratic
freedoms would appear to have suffered more from danger within than
without, from partisans than from enemies, while the country has been
exposed to a witch-hunt of greater ferocity than anything developed in
the early days of Salem, albeit one far less productive of tangible result.
These reports provide a commentary on committee techniques, on committee practices, and on the methods of the opposition, which should be read
by all citizens, although they might have been brought up to date
2
before republication occurred.
The final chapter of this book, prepared by a well-known worker in
the field of civil liberty, serves to summarize the lessons to be learned
from these attempts to root out disloyalty toward the American form of
government. At the same time, the editor points to what better could have
been done. A "slight enlargement of calm and common sense," he indicates, should accomplish far more than a piling up of bulwark after
bulwark in the form of statutes, often of doubtful validity, directed
against opinions and associations rather than concentrating on actions.
Some of these statutory proposals, he notes, border on the ludicrous, such
as the one that all school buses, in a parade of blatant patriotism, should
be painted in red, white and blue stripes. Others he considers to be more
offensive in their sterile approach to what he thinks should be a program
of affirmative character. The vapidity of a requirement for an oath, so
frequently made the basis of current recommendations, backed with no
more than the doubtful sanction of a prosecution for perjury, could hardly
be said to fill the bill. Statutory direction for removal from office, or for
1 The record of state achievement, as opposed to claim, reads a little like the
story of the small girl who burst into the house exclaiming about the "million cats
in our back-yard." Pressed for details, she replied "There's at least a thousand !"
Challenged still further, she ended up by saying "Well, there's our cat and the one

from next door!"
2 The chapter on New York by Dean Chamberlain of Columbia College, for example, represents a condensation of his Loyalty and Legislative Action (Ithaca, New
York, Cornell University Press), published in 1951, at which time the Feinberg Law
of that state was still before the courts. The later history is now disclosed in the
more recent decision In Adler v. Board of Education. 342 U. S. 485, 72 St. Ct. 380.
96 L. Ed. 517 (1952). It could also be pointed out that the Ohio law requiring an
oath from a recipient of unemployment compensation benefits and a California
ordinance imposing a similar test on public employees have received judicial examination. See note in 29 CHICAoO-KsNT LAW REWvn
255-60 (1951), on Dworken v.
Collopy, 91 N. E. (2d) 564 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1950), and Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 493, 200 P. (2d) 958 (1950). The decision in the last
mentioned case was subsequently affirmed in 341 U. S. 716, 71 S. Ct. 909, 95 L. Ed.
1317 (1951).
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the denial-of other governmental benefits, borders perilously close to interference with a constitutional freedom to believe even the unpopular
thought. So also as to other suggestions which have been made, but the
book should be left to speak for itself.
One other valuable feature is to be found in the form of two appendices. The first of these classifies the several types of state law regarding
subversion and subversive activities. The other depicts the extent to
which, state by state, such measures have been adopted. The whole, therefore, forms a scholarly work likely to operate as a corrective in an area
where much of what has been written and said has been the product of
inquisitorial vehemence rather than founded on fact.

